» Foreign Influence

Federal agencies have expressed concern that foreign entities may be using the academic research enterprise in an attempt to compromise the United States’ economic competitiveness and national security. Federal funding agencies have sought to clarify longstanding policies and issued new guidance.

The primary concerns related to Undue Foreign Influence:

1. Peer review violations

2. Failure to disclose substantial foreign resources:

•  Foreign employment arrangements
• Foreign grant support that creates problems with overlap, or over-commitment
• Non-disclosure of substantial foreign research support
• Talents awards
• Foreign grants – Hidden transfers of information, know-how, data, person-time

3. Failure to disclose significant foreign financial Conflict of Interest:

• Equity in foreign companies
• Foreign patents that leverage US tax-payer funded work

4. Compliance with Regulatory Requirements: U.S. Export Control laws and regulations establish a set of requirements for the transfer of technology and data to foreign countries and/or foreign nationals in the U.S and sanctions from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) restrict interactions with individuals or entities on the sanctions list.

As a PI/PD or as senior/key personnel, note that you remain personally responsible for the completeness and accuracy of your documents, even if departmental research administrative staff have assisted you in document preparation. Below are several relevant policies and regulations that PI’s are subject to when considering foreign activity:

• Grant applicants shall disclose Other Support to ensure no scientific, budgetary or commitment overlap, including “all financial resources, whether Federal, non-Federal, commercial or institutional, available in direct support of an individual's research endeavors.”
• Recipients must determine whether supported activities include a foreign component, which may or may not involve the direct use of NIH grant funds (e.g. performance of work by a researcher or recipient in a foreign location or a collaborator outside of the U.S. who performs experiments in support of an NIH-funded project or with an expected co-authorship). 
• Researchers must disclose any remuneration from foreign institutions as a disclosable significant conflict of interest.

In addition, please remember to limit acknowledgments in published work (e.g., peer reviewed journal articles) to only those projects that actually supported the work discussed in the paper.

The federal funding agencies periodically issue some form of communication, guidance, new regulations or policies related to dealing with the issue of undue foreign influences on research integrity. Below you will find a list of source documents from each agency or organization.

National Institutes of Health [NIH]

In August 2018, Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Francis Collins issued a Foreign Influence Letter to Grantees and testified to the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee regarding concerns about systematic programs of foreign influence in U.S. research.

NIH Director Collins Dear Colleague Foreign Influence Letter

In December 2018 and June 2019, the NIH Advisory Committee to the Director (ACD) released a report entitled ACD Working Group for Foreign Influences on Research Integrity identifying recommendations around communication and awareness; risk mitigation; and monitoring, actions, and consequences.

NIH Advisory Committee to the Director Foreign Influence Report June 2019

NIH Advisory Committee to the Director Foreign Influence Report December 2018

Reminders of NIH Policies on Other Support and on Policies related to Financial Conflicts of Interest and Foreign Components NOT-OD-19-114 July 10, 2019

Frequently Asked Questions Other Support and Foreign Components Initial Posting: June 19, 2019

National Science Foundation [NSF]

NSF Commissioned JASON Report 

NSF commissioned the report to enhance the agency’s understanding of the threats to basic research posed by foreign governments that have taken actions that violate the principles of scientific ethics and research integrity. With the official receipt of the report, NSF will now begin the process of analyzing its findings and recommendations.

NEWS ALERT: US National Science Foundation reveals first details on foreign-influence investigations [NEW July 2020] https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02051-8

“The US National Science Foundation (NSF) has for the first time released figures on the actions it has taken against researchers found to have violated rules on the disclosure of foreign ties. Since 2018, the agency has reassigned, suspended or terminated grants, forced institutions to return funds or barred researchers from applying for future funding in 16–20 cases in which rules weren’t followed, according to Rebecca Keiser, the agency’s first chief of research security strategy and policy. All of these were cases in which the NSF’s Office of Inspector General, an independent body responsible for oversight of the agency and its grant recipients, had investigated and made recommendations on how to handle sanctions. Separately, the inspector-general referred an undisclosed number of criminal and civil cases involving fraud and nondisclosure to the US Department of Justice. Furthermore, in the past two months, seven universities have contacted the NSF directly with information on faculty members who might have violated rules.”

NSF- Statement of The National Science Board on Security and Science October 23, 2018 NSB-2018-42

Proposal & Award Policies & Procedures Guide January 2020

NSF Dear Colleague Research Protection Letter 7.11.19

The NSF Dear Colleague letter outlined a few steps it is taking to mitigate the risks in concert with other agencies and stakeholders. Highlights from the letter:

• Citizenship Requirements
  • To ensure that NSF is applying consistent standards to all staff members, each of whom has access to sensitive merit review and other information, we issued a requirement in April 2018 that rotators working onsite at NSF must be U.S. citizens or have applied for U.S. citizenship.
• Disclosure Requirements
  • Since 1978, NSF has required senior project personnel on proposals to disclose all sources of support, both foreign and domestic.
• Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide
  • A renewed effort is now underway to ensure that existing requirements to disclose current and pending support information are known, understood, and followed.
  • For example, in May, we published in the Federal Register a proposed clarification of our proposal disclosure requirements (open for public comment through July 29). Our draft NSF Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide includes clarifications regarding reporting requirements for both current and pending support and professional appointments.
  • To streamline the process for providing these disclosures to NSF, we are proposing use of an electronic format for submission of biographical sketches, including disclosure of all appointments. As currently envisioned, this will become effective in January 2020. We are also working to develop an electronic format for disclosure of current and pending support information.
• Foreign Government Talent Programs
  • Finally, we are issuing a policy making it clear that NSF personnel and IPAs detailed to NSF cannot participate in foreign government talent recruitment programs. There is a risk that participation in foreign government talent recruitment programs by NSF personnel and IPAs will compromise the ethical principles that bind us. Moreover, such participation poses significant risks of inappropriate foreign influence on NSF policies, programs, and priorities, including the integrity of NSF's merit review process—risks we simply cannot accept.

Department of Energy [DOE]

DOE Directive O 486.1A, Foreign Government Sponsored or Affiliated Activities September 4, 2020

To ensure the continued flow of scientific and technical information consistent with the Department of Energy’s (DOE) broad scientific mission, while also ensuring protection of U.S. competitive and national security interests and DOE program objectives; preventing potential conflicts of interest, e.g., financial interests, conflicts of commitment, and outside employment, which may undermine the DOE research enterprise; and limiting unauthorized transfers of scientific and technical information. Cancels DOE O 486.1, dated 6-7-2019.

Science Article on DOE Policies February 8, 2019

DOE Directive regarding Foreign Government Talent Recruitment, June 7, 2019 

DOE Order 486.1: "To ensure the continued flow of scientific and technical information consistent with the Department of Energy’s (DOE) broad scientific mission, while also ensuring protection of U.S. competitive and national security interests and DOE program objectives; and limiting unauthorized transfers of scientific and technical information."

Department of Defense [DOD]

Department of Defense Letter raising awareness of efforts to combat foreign influences on research integrity. The letter highlights the efforts of JCORE - Joint Committee on the Research Environment

"In his September 16, 2019. letter to the research community. Dr. Kelvin Droegemeier, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), described a new OSTP-led interagency Joint Committee on the Research Environment (JCORE).

DoD is an active participant in JCORE, and in its sub-committee on Research Security, which is initially focused on coordinating four lines of Federal effort:

1. coordinating outreach and engagement
2. disclosure requirements for participation in federally funded research
3. best practices for academic research institutions
4. methods for identification, assessment, and management of risk

This work will help agencies that fund Federal research to develop common standards for identifying and adjudicating conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment from these disclosures. It will also help agencies that fund Federal research to clarify consequences for failing to make these disclosures."

Department of State [DOS]

The State Department has issued a new determination under the Foreign Missions Act, requiring members of the Chinese diplomatic corps to notify the State Department when making visits to educational and research institutions, among other entities.

The Department’s determination requires U.S.-based personnel of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) foreign missions (including personnel at the embassy and consulates of the PRC and those on temporary assignments conducting official business for the PRC government) to notify the State Department’s Office of Foreign Missions in advance of:

• Official visits to educational institutions
• Official visits to research institutions, including National Labs
• Official meetings with state officials
• Official meetings with local and municipal officials

Chinese diplomats only need to inform the Department of these types of meetings. They do not need the State Department’s permission to visit educational institutions. The State Department indicated that the PRC government has chosen to prevent American diplomats from gaining access to Chinese campuses for educational and cultural programming, including programs that encourage students to study at American educational institutions.  The new policy for PRC officials is a result of this situation.

NYT Article Under New Rule, Chinese Diplomats Must Notify State Dept. of Meetings in U.S. 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA]

“NASA is restricted by specific applications of Section 1340(a) of The Department of Defense and Full-Year Appropriations Act, Public Law 112-10 (NASA's 2011 continuing resolution), and Section 539 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriation Act of 2012, Public Law 112-55 (NASA's FY 2012 appropriation) from using funding appropriated in the Acts to enter into or fund any grant or cooperative agreement of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company, at the prime recipient level or at any subrecipient level, whether the bilateral involvement is funded or performed under a no-exchange of funds arrangement.”