Dr. Daniel Kovenock
Professor
Economic Science Institute
The George L. Argyros College of Business and Economics
Expertise: Game Theory; Industrial Organization; Political Economy;
Office Location:
Wilkinson Hall 106
- Education:
- The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Bachelor of Science
University of Wisconsin - Madison, Ph.D.
Biography
Research Interests:
Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Microeconomic Theory, Political Economy, Public Economics
Recent Creative, Scholarly Work and Publications
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Paarporn, K., R. Chandan, D. Kovenock, M. Alizadeh, and J.R. Marden, "Analyzing Pre-Commitment Strategies in General Lotto Games," Proceedings of the American Control Conference, Volume 2023-May, pp. 441-446.
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Chandan, R., K. Paarporn, D. Kovenock, M. Alizadeh, and J.R. Marden, "The Art of Concession in General Lotto Games." In: Fang, F., Shu, F. (eds) Game Theory for Networks. GameNets 2022. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST, 457 pp. 310-327.
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Gelder, A., D. Kovenock, and B. Roberson (2022), “All-Pay Auctions with Ties,” Economic Theory, 74, pp. 1183-1231
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Kovenock, D. and B. Roberson (2021), “Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto Games,” Economic Theory, 71, pp. 997-1032.
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Chowdhury, S.M., D. Kovenock, D. Rojo Arjona, and N. Wilcox (2021), “Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-Battle Contests,” The Economic Journal,131, pp. 1593-1619.
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Ewerhart, C. and D. Kovenock (2021), “A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games with Multidimensional Private Information,” Operations Research Letters, 49, pp. 418-425.
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Kovenock, D. and D. Rojo Arjona (2019), “A Full Characterization of Best-Response Functions in the Lottery Colonel Blotto Game,” Economics Letters, 182, pp. 33-36.
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Barbieri, S., D. Kovenock, D. Malueg, and I. Topolyan (2019), "Group Contests with Private Information and the 'Weakest Link,'" Games and Economic Behavior, 118, pp. 382-411.
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Kovenock, D., B. Roberson, and R. Sheremeta (2019), "The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks," Public Choice, 179, pp. 175-194.