Dr. Roman M. Sheremeta
- BK 303L
- Office Hours:
- T: 1-3 pm
- (714) 744-7604
- The National Technical University, Bachelor of Arts
Purdue University, Master of Science
Purdue University, Ph.D. in Economics
Roman Sheremeta is an Associate Professor of Economics at Chapman University and a Research Associate at the Economic Science Institute. He is also a Research Fellow at Max Plank Institute and an Associate Fellow at the Purdue University Teaching Academy. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Purdue University in 2009. Sheremeta is a recipient of many research and teaching awards, including Robert W. Johnson Award for his dissertation research, as well as multiple grants, including the National Science Foundation, Max Planck Institute, and Economic Science Institute grants. As of March 2013, according to RePEc, Professor Sheremeta is ranked #2 on the list of Top 100 Young Economists worldwide who have graduated in the last 5 years.
Sheremeta’s research interests include experimental and behavioral economics, game theory, industrial organization, public and labor economics, and economics of conflict. He has published 25 academic papers in a wide variety of economic and political science journals, including Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Economic Inquiry, Economic Theory, European Economic Review, Social Choice and Welfare, Public Choice, and Economics Letters.
Using experimental methods and theoretical models, Sheremeta has addressed a variety of economic issues on conflict and conflict resolution, tournaments and contests, team competitions, multi-dimensional conflicts, attack and defense of networks, terrorism and profiling, communication and information signaling, trust-based relationships, coordination and behavioral spillovers.
- Recent Creative, Scholarly Work and Publications
“Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games,” with Tim Cason and Anya Savikhin, European Economic Review, 2012, 56, 233-245.
“Communication and Efficiency in Competitive Coordination Games,” with Tim Cason and Jingjing Zhang, Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 76, 26-43.
“Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege,” with Cary Deck, Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming.
“An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games,” with Subhasish Chowdhury and Dan Kovenock, Economic Theory, forthcoming.
“Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict,” with Erik Kimbrough, International Journal of Industrial Organization, forthcoming.
“Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and Cooperative Games,” with Anya Savikhin, Economic Inquiry, forthcoming.
“Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation,” Economic Inquiry, 2011, 49, 573–590.
“Endowment Effects in Contests,” with Curtis R. Price, Economics Letters, 2011, 111, 217–219.
“A Generalized Tullock Contest,” with Subhasish Chowdhury, Public Choice, 2011, 147, 413–420.
“Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests,” with Subhasish Chowdhury, Economics Letters, 2011, 112, 216-219.
“Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, 68, 731–747.
“Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: An Experimental Study,” with Tim Cason and Will Masters, Journal of Public Economics, 2010, 94, 604–611.
“Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-Bidding in Contests?” with Jingjing Zhang, Social Choice and Welfare, 2010, 35, 175–197.
“Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2010, 54, 771–798.